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Mathews v. Eldridge: Procedural Due Process
Requirements in Social Security Disability
Benefit Terminations
Respondent George Eldridge was awarded Social Security disability bene-
fits beginning June 1968. Eldridge brought an action when the Social
Security Agency, pursuant to the agency's procedure for termination,'
advised him that his benefits would cease after July 1972. The district court
held for respondent that the SSA's procedure was unconstitutional, 2 and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed.8  Held, reversed: Lack of a pre-termination
hearing does not violate constitutional due process in cases involving termi-
nation of Social Security disability benefits. Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct.
893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).
I. PRIOR DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS
The Supreme Court has defined procedural due process to include notice
and "some kind of hearing."4  The only rigid standard followed by the
Court, however, has been that the notice and hearing "be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 5 Therefore, the due process
problem in recent years has centered around the type of hearing required in
various situations.6
Goldberg v. Kelly 7 provided an answer to one aspect of the problem by
holding that a pre-termination hearing was required before welfare benefits
1. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b), 421, 423(a)(1)(D) (1970). In May
1972 the Virginia state agency reviewed a questionnaire completed by respondent and
medical reports from his personal physician and a psychiatrist who had examined him.
The Social Security Act provides for this initial determination by a state agency as to
disability issues. id. § 421. The agency advised respondent by letter that it had deter-
mined he was able to work, and that his disability benefits would terminate in July, two
months after the determination of termination was made. Id. § 423 (a) (1) (D). Re-
spondent had the opportunity to respond in writing to the agency's decision, which he
did, stating that the SSA had sufficient evidence to establish this disability. Id. §§
405(b), 421(d). The agency upheld its temporary decision, which was accepted
by the Social Security Agency. Respondent Eldridge chose not to apply for state agency
reconsideration, to which he was entitled. Id. § 423 (a) (1) (D).
2. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973).
3. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974).
4. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). For a discussion of the sig-
nificance of this requirement see Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1267 (1975).
5. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
6. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Armstrong
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (child custody); Willner v. Committee on Character
& Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (practice of law); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959) (employment by government contractor); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S.
551 (1956) (public employment); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951) (political beliefs of organization); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (trust assets).
7. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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could be terminated.8 Having determined that the benefits constituted a
property right,9 the Court in Goldberg ruled on the basis of various criteria
that a pre-termination hearing was necessary to protect the welfare recipi-
ent's interests. 10  The criteria involved included "need,"" the presence of
adjudicative facts, 12 and the necessity of oral communication with recipi-
ents. 13 The Court also examined the state's economic and administrative
interests, thus applying a balancing test advocated by previous cases.' 4
Subsequent decisions applied this test flexibly.15 This is best demonstrated
by Fuentes v. Shevin'6 in which purchasers of household goods under
conditional sales contracts challenged the constitutionality of two state
statutes concerning pre-judgment replevin procedures.' 7 The Court, finding
a pre-termination hearing requisite to the protection of the purchaser's right
to procedural due process, concluded that "necessity" as discussed in the
Goldberg decision was only a factor, not a requirement, in a determination
whether a pre-termination hearing should be held.' 8 Fuentes could have
been interpreted to expand Goldberg further to require that opportunity for a
pre-termination hearing be provided in all cases involving property depriva-
tion. A citation to Boddie v. Connecticut'9 seems to support such a
contention. 20  The balancing test of procedural due process was revived,
8. The reasoning of Goldberg has been followed in subsequent decisions. See, e.g.,
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Mor-
risey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
9. 397 U.S. at 262. The agency in Goldberg conceded that welfare benefits cre-
ated a property right for the recipient. This struck a serious blow to the "right-priv-
ilege" doctrine which had been so prevalent in cases involving statutory entitlement.
See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). Thus, the Court cleared the way
for a more liberal application of procedural due process in such cases.
10. In addition, the Court ruled that the following elements were necessary parts
of a pre-termination hearing: (1) notice of the reasons for the proposed termination,
(2) right to appear personally and be represented by an attorney, (3) opportunity to
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and (4) right to a written decision by an
impartial decisionmaker based on the evidence produced at the hearing. 397 U.S. at
266-71.
11. "By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without funds or assets ....
Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of . . . 'brutal need' with-
out a prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations
justify it." 397 U.S. at 261, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
12. The Court found that the necessity of determining certain facts about the wel-
fare recipient's need called for an oral hearing at which both sides of the issue could
be presented. 397 U.S. at 269.
13. The Court noted that a welfare recipient's ability to write is often limited, and
that he could more effectively discuss his problems if allowed an oral hearing. Id.
14. "What procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances
must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function in-
volved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."
Id. at 263, quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
15. See note 8 supra.
16. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
17. Both Florida and Pennsylvania provisions were challenged. No hearing was al-
lowed before seizure of property. The person from whom it had been seized was re-
quired either to post a bond for double the value of the property or to participate in
a repossession action.
18. 407 U.S. at 89-90.
19. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
20. The Court commented: "[Tihat the hearing required by due process is subject
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nevertheless, when the Court made an exception to a pre-termination
hearing for cases involving "extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until
after the event."' 21  The fact that no definite procedure was formulated for
the hearing is also significant in that it demonstrates a reluctance by the
Court to rigidify requirements for a pre-termination procedure.
Although the Goldberg requirement of a pre-termination hearing was
expanded through Fuentes to include other situations,22 a limitation of the
doctrine was noted in two cases decided in 1974.23 Arnett v. Kennedy24
applied the balancing test narrowly to a government employment case. The
Court distinguished the Arnett ruling from that of Goldberg and Fuentes by
noting that the earlier cases dealt with areas of the law dissimilar to the area
of government employer-employee relations in Arnett. Procedural due
process requirements under one set of interests might not be necessary under
another set.2 5  Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.26 applied the same narrow
application of the balancing test in a determination that a pre-termination
hearing was not required in a sequestration case.27
The balancing test has been applied narrowly in cases involving Social
Security benefits.28 The Court has often managed to avoid the due process
issue in such cases. 29  In Richardson v. Perales,30 however, the Court
addressed an aspect of the need for procedural due process, the presence of
factual controversy. A doctor's evidence was regarded in Perales as "sub-
stantial evidence" in Social Security eligibility cases. The decision that a
determination of disability did not involve questions of fact signaled the view
to waiver, and is not fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an individual
be given an opportunity for hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest .... "407 U.S. at 82, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79
(1971).
21. Id. The Court quoted Boddie again in noting that the necessity for a pre-
termination hearing depended "upon the importance of the interests involved and the
nature of the subsequent proceedings [if any]. . . ." Id., quoting 401 U.S. at 378.
22. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student suspended from school);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison inmate's good time credits); Morrisey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolee's freedom).
23. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974); see Comment, Constitutional Dimensions of the Amended Texas Sequestra-
tion Statute, 29 Sw. L.J. 884 (1975).
24. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). This case revived the "right-privilege" doctrine thought
to have been abandoned in Goldberg. Id. at 155; see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
25. 416 U.S. at 155.
26. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
27. Mitchell, in which a post-termination hearing was held sufficient for procedural
due process requirements, so narrowed Fuentes that the majority felt Fuentes had been
overruled. Mr. Justice Powell thought only the opinion, rather than the holding, had
been overruled. Id. at 623-24 (Powell, J., concurring). A more recent case has further
confused the area by holding an "early" hearing to be one manner in which to satisfy
procedural requirements. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 660 (1975).
28. See Meyerhoff & Mishkin, Application of Goldberg v. Kelly Hearing Require-
ments to Termination of Social Security Benefits, 26 STAN. L. REV. 549 (1974). This
contention is supported by Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80 (1971), in which the
Court questioned whether the right to Social Security benefits was a property right at
all.
29. See, e.g., California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
30. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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that a pre-termination hearing was not required before all terminations of
social security benefits. 31
The Supreme Court's reluctance to rule directly that a pre-termination
hearing would not be required in disability benefit cases is evidenced by
Richardson v. Wright.32  In Wright the Court decided to allow the Social
Security Agency to utilize its new procedure for termination 33 before
determining the procedure's constitutionality. This was the same type of
situation as was involved in Goldberg where the Court disregarded a new
agency procedure for welfare benefit termination.3 4 Thus, disability benefit
termination was regarded differently by the Court, and, consequently, there
was much speculation as to the decision which would be reached when the
Court was once again faced with this issue.85
II. MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE
The opportunity to end speculation was presented by Mathews 1,.
Eldridge. On appeal to the Supreme Court the Social Security Agency
contended that a pre-termination hearing was not required in the termination
of disability benefits.36 The Court held that a post-termination hearing in
the cessation of disability benefits met the requirements of procedural due
process.8 7
To reach this conclusion the Court balanced interests similar to those in
Goldberg,38 yet arrived at an opposite decision. 39  Since a rigid pre-
termination procedure had not been consistently required in previous deci-
sions, 40 the Court rationalized that one need not be required at all. 41
Balancing the interests revealed that a post-termination hearing met the
"some kind of hearing" requirement.
31. The same pattern was evidenced in Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1975), a case involving the right to a pre-termination hearing before reduction of sur-
vivors' benefits. The Second Circuit found a post-termination hearing adequate. See
Note, Hearing Not Required Before Reduction of Social Security Benefits Where Right
to Benefits Claimed by Third Party, 89 HARv. L. REv. 610 (1976).
32. 405 U.S. 208 (1972).
33. See note 1 supra. The procedure had been developed subsequent to the filing
of Wright's lawsuit.
34. The dissent in Goldberg commented on this disregard. 397 U.S. at 282 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
35. Note the conclusion reached in Meyerhoff & Mishkin, supra note 28, at 575.
36. The SSA also contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case
because respondent had not exhausted available administrative review. Jurisdiction was
questioned on the basis of Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Salfi held that
district courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over an action seeking a review of a decision
of the Secretary of HEW unless a "final" decision has been made by the Secretary. Pe-
titioner argued that no final decision had been made in Eldridge's case, as he had not
obtained full administrative review of the termination of his disability benefits. The Su-
preme Court concluded that as "final" a decision over a constitutional claim as the SSA
could reach had been made.
37. 96 S. Ct. at 910, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 42.
38. See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text.
39. Eldridge did rule on the "right-privilege" distinction in much the same fashion
as Goldberg. This aspect of the decision firmly established the status of disability bene-
fits as property. See note 28 supra.
40. In Goldberg, for example, the Court had only outlined a pre-termination proce-
dure. See note 10 supra.
41. 96 S. Ct. at 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 32.
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The Court found that balancing demonstrated the Social Security Agency's
post-termination hearing to be procedurally acceptable. The process the
Agency followed in the termination of disability benefits was reviewed in
detail and analyzed in light of the interests involved. 42  First, the Court
examined the private interests of recipients such as Eldridge, 43 and noted
that an evidentiary pre-termination hearing had been required in past cases
only when "need" was involved.44  Such a finding narrows the theory in
Fuentes that "need" is not required for a pre-termination hearing. Second,
the Court distinguished Social Security benefit recipients from welfare recipi-
ents in terms of need.45  The deprivation here was found to be less than in
Goldberg.40 This finding demonstrates a heavy reliance on the need analy-
sis in Arnett.47
As in Arnett the Court in Eldridge found that private resources and other
governmental assistance could compensate for ihe deprivation of a recipient's
benefits. The dissent contended that the fundamental importance of contin-
ued receipt of benefits is not altered by the possibility that the recipient may
qualify for welfare. 48 As in Arnett, this contention goes unanswered by the
majority.49 The fact that disability benefits continue for two months after a
decision to terminate 50 could have been emphasized.
Whether additional procedural safeguards would aid the beneficiary was
examined by the Court in a more persuasive manner.51 The Court relied
upon Perales in its determination that questions of fact which would
necessitate an oral pre-termination hearing were not involved in Eldridge's
situation.52  Petitioner's argument that medical evidence was sufficient to
avoid a fact controversy was accepted by the Court.53  Finding that the
credibility of medical evidence would be in question only in a rare number of
cases, the majority assumed, with the petitioner, that procedural rules are
designed for the general case and not the exception.
54
The merit of the petitioner's position that written reports were a more
effective means of presentation for doctors than oral submissions was also
42. Id. at 903-05, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 33-36.
43. Id. at 905-07, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 36-38.
44. Id. at 905, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 36.
45. Although the Court's theory seems valid, arguments have been made to the con-
trary. Reports on the financial status of disability benefit recipients reveal a high per-
centage of poverty among those individuals. See Meyerhoff & Mishkin, supra note 28,
at 564. The dissent pointed out that Eldridge lost his home and furniture and his family
was forced to sleep in one bed due to the termination of his disability benefits. 96 S.
Ct. at 910, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. 96 S. Ct. at 906, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 37.
47. 416 U.S. at 169 (Powell, J., concurring).
48. 96 S. Ct. at 910, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. 416 U.S. at 221 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Meyerhoff & Mishkin, supra
note 28, at 565. The recipient may not be able to qualify for welfare, he may be re-
quired to subject his home to a lien for the amount of assistance he will receive, and
his privacy and dignity may be injured.
50. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1970).
51. 96 S. Ct. at 907-09, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 38-40.
52. Id. at 907, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 39. The theory that a physician's examination is
a documented decision seems stronger in Eldridge than in Perales. The doctor involved





acknowledged by the Court.55 Unfortunately, the question of the recipient's
ability to present written arguments was inadequately examined. At issue
was not the recipient's right to the adversary process, Goldberg having
limited that right, 56 but rather his right to effective communication with the
SSA. The Court did not face the question of the recipient's actual ability to
write, 57 but focused instead on his protection through various agency
opportunities.5 8 There was assurance of agency assistance in completing a
questionnaire concerning disability, although the recipient personally filled
out the form. Emphasis was directed to the recipient's ongoing right to
obtain information from the SSA, the Court describing this process as one of
"molding" the recipient's arguments to respond to the crucial issues at
stake.59  Specific examples of "molding" would have strengthened the
Court's contention that such a process adequately protected the recipient's
right to effective communication.
The most valid criticism of the Court's reasoning with respect to procedur-
al safeguards arises from the majority's reliance on generalities. The Court
held that all physicians' reports were credible, all written submissions were
effective, and all recipients could write or receive enough assistance in
writing to counter a government agency's arguments effectively. The proce-
dure designed to protect the recipient's interest was held sufficient even
though tailored only for the general case. An argument contrary to the
Court's position emphasized the high reversal rate of SSA decisions as
evidence of the inadequacy of the present procedure. 60 This argument
deserved more discussion than a cursory reference to the SSA's "open-file"
system of decision. 61 The Court's position that the system's effectiveness
distinguished Eldridge from Goldberg should have been supported not by
generalization, but by a detailed explanation of how the system operated.
The Court also attempted to distinguish Goldberg by balancing the public
interest against the personal interest of the recipient.6 2 As in Goldberg the
Court examined cost and agency efficiency. In Eldridge, however, the
burden of these factors was heavy enough to tip the scales in favor of the
SSA. 63 The Court's reliance on Arnett, Boddie, and Perales was significant
to the outcome of the balancing process. The A rnett and Boddie decisions
support the view that a pre-termination hearing should not always be
55. Id. at 907-08, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 39-40.
56. 397 U.S. at 266; see text accompanying note 40 supra. For a discussion of the
adversary system as it relates to procedural due process see Rubenstein, Procedural Due
Process and the Limits of the Adversary System, 11 HARV. Civ. RiHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REV.
48 (1976).
57. The Court in Goldberg had faced this question. See note 13 supra.
58. 96 S. Ct. at 908, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 39-40.
59. Id., 47 L. Ed. 2d at 40.
60. Id.; see Brief for AFL-CIO/Green as Amici Curiae at 7-13.
61. 96 S. Ct. at 908 & n.29, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 40 & n.29; see Supplemental and Reply
Brief for Petitioner at 14. Files on recipients are not permanently closed because of
the possibility of new developments in their cases. Thus, the Social Security system is
an "open-file" one.
62. 96 S. Ct. at 909-10, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 40-42.
63. Id. For a different view see Brief for AFL-CIO/Green as Amici Curiae at
19-23, stating that the costs involved here were substantially less than those in Gold-
berg. Amici rested this contention on the possibility of recoupment under the Social
Security disability program.
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